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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Amy Lynn Shoemaker appeals the district court’s denial of her motion in 
limine. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Shoemaker with felony driving under the influence.  
(R., pp. 59-61.)  The felony enhancement in this case was predicated on a 2007 
felony DUI guilty plea.  (R., pp. 62-63.)  
 Shoemaker filed a motion in limine to exclude introduction of any evidence 
of the 2007 case.  (R., pp. 72-74, 79-81.)  She noted that the prior case “was 
dismissed on June 25, 2009 in response to defendant’s successful completion of 
drug court.”  (R., p. 72.)  Shoemaker contended that after she pleaded guilty in 
the 2007 case, the case “did not proceed to sentencing” and “no Judgment of 
Conviction ever was entered” against her, and therefore evidence of the 2007 
conviction was inadmissible in this case.  (R., pp. 72-73, 79.)  The state 
responded that per the plain language of the relevant statute and controlling 
case law the 2007 guilty plea was a valid predicate for a felony DUI 
enhancement.  (R., pp. 83-91.) 
 The district court denied Shoemaker’s motion, basing its decision on State 
v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 319 P.3d 1191 (2014) and State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 
901, 243 P.3d 1089 (Ct. App. 2010). (R., pp. 125-26.)  Thereafter, Shoemaker 
pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of her motion, and 





Shoemaker states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Shoemaker’s motion in 
limine? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 













 Shoemaker contends the district court erred by denying her motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of her 2007 DUI conviction.  She argues on appeal 
that the court erred “because the [2007] case did not proceed to sentencing and 
she was transferred to drug court, and the guilty plea was eventually set aside 
and the case was dismissed.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)   
This argument fails.  Based on the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005 and 
this Court’s holding in Glenn, Shoemaker’s prior guilty plea is a valid predicate 
for a sentencing enhancement in this case.  The district court correctly concluded 
the same. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 
199 P.3d 123, 150 (2008). 
 
C. Shoemaker Pleaded Guilty To Felony DUI In 2007 And Per The Plain 
Language Of The Controlling Statute And Caselaw, This Was A Sufficient 
Predicate For The Sentencing Enhancement In This Case 
 
 The Idaho Code sets forth the following sentencing enhancement for 
repeat DUI offenders: 
(9)  Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (4) and (6) of this 
section, any person who has pled guilty or has been found 
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guilty of a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 
Idaho Code, a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-
8004C, Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-
8006, Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-4006 
3. (b), Idaho Code, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or 
withheld judgment(s) or any substantially conforming foreign 
criminal felony violation, notwithstanding the form of the 
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and within fifteen (15) years 
pleads guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the provisions 
of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony and shall 
be sentenced pursuant to subsection (6) of this section. 
 
I.C. § 18-8005(9) (emphasis added). 
This Court addressed this statute’s plain language in State v. Glenn, 
156 Idaho 22, 319 P.3d 1191 (2014).  Presenting a similar argument, the 
defendant there moved to dismiss a felony DUI, noting that it was predicated on 
a prior DUI that had ultimately been dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604.  
Glenn, 156 Idaho at 23, 319 P.3d at 1192.  Glenn argued on appeal that 
because the prior conviction “was dismissed, there was no prior conviction for 
the State to base its enhancement on.”  Id. 
This Court disagreed, citing the plain statutory language: 
I.C. § 18–8005 provides sentencing enhancements for any person 
who “pled guilty or has been found guilty” of more than one DUI 
within a specified amount of time, which applies when there is a 
determination of guilt by a conviction or plea.  The focus of 
I.C. § 18–8005 is then not on performance during probation, but 
instead on the instant the finding of guilt is made either by the jury 
or the defendant’s plea. Here, Glenn was a person who pled 
guilty to more than one DUI within fifteen years. 
 
Glenn, 156 Idaho at 25, 319 P.3d at 1194 (emphasis added, internal citations 
omitted).  Moreover, this Court found that “withdrawing a guilty plea and 
dismissing the case does not change the fact that the defendant pled guilty or 
was found guilty,” and I.C. § 18-8005 “does not require a current conviction or 
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judgment; it applies whenever a person ‘pled guilty or has been found guilty.’”  Id. 
at 26, 319 P.3d at 1195.  This Court concluded that the statute was 
“unambiguous” in its application to Glenn, “because Glenn was a person who in 
2010 pled guilty to a DUI within fifteen years of pleading guilty to a previous 
felony DUI.”  Id. 
 Here, the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005 resolves the only issue on 
appeal. Shoemaker pleaded guilty to felony DUI in 2007, thus establishing the 
predicate for a felony enhancement in this case.  (Defense Ex. 2 (Marked as 
State’s Ex. 2)); I.C. § 18-8005(9); Glenn, 156 Idaho at 24-26, 319 P.3d at 1193-
95.  Shoemaker argues that the district court erred “because the case did not 
proceed to sentencing and she was transferred to drug court, and the guilty plea 
was eventually set aside and the case was dismissed.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  
But this argument fails in light of Glenn, which found the issue was simply 
“whether a defendant has pled guilty to a previous DUI.”  Glenn, 156 Idaho at 26, 
319 P.3d at 1195.  Because Shoemaker pleaded guilty in 2007—regardless of 
any subsequent procedural history—the statute plainly applies. 
 Shoemaker pleaded guilty to a felony DUI in 2007 thus establishing the 
predicate for a felony sentencing enhancement in this case.  The district court 
therefore correctly applied the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005 and Glenn when 






 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order 
denying Shoemaker’s motion in limine. 
 DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans_______ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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